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1 Introduction
A growing number of firms choose to break down their production process
into various stages spread across different countries or regions.1 Specifically,
the firm organizes and performs discrete activities in distinct locations, which
altogether form a supply chain starting at the conception of the product and
ending at its delivery. This spatial fragmentation of production aims at tak-
ing advantage of differences in technologies, factor endowments, or factor
prices across places (Feenstra, 1998). It is regarded as one of the main ingre-
dients of the process of economic globalization and, as such, has generated
harsh debates in most countries. In particular, some policy makers and the
general press in industrialized countries tend to view it as the main force
driving the growing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
For various groups and nongovernmental organizations, the liberalization of
trade and capital flows, which go hand in hand with fragmentation, would
also be detrimental to undeveloped countries, by fostering more international
economic inequality. Our purpose is to show that globalization need not have
such detrimental implications for low-income people and countries.
The most commonly observed pattern corresponding to international frag-
mentation is such that firms re-locate their production activities in low-wage
regions, while keeping their strategic functions (e.g. management, R&D,
marketing and finance) concentrated in a few affluent urban regions where
the high-skilled workers they need are available. For example, whereas the
metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka retain a large number of headquar-
ters, business-to-business service firms and research labs, a growing number
of Japanese manufacturing plants move to China where labor is much cheaper
(the Chinese/Japanese wage ratio varies from 1/10 to 1/20). This is espe-
cially well illustrated by the electronics industry, which is the fastest-growing
manufacturing sector in Japan since the mid-1970s. This industry is domi-
nated by nine firms (Hitachi, Matsushita Electric, Toshiba, NEC, Mitsubishi
Electric, Fujitsu, Sony, Sanyo Electric, and Sharp), of which total sales in
1990 were almost 200 billion dollars. Fujita and Ishii (1998) report that,
from 1975 to 1994, the number of overseas plants located in East Asia has
increased from 40 to 143. By contrast, the number of R&D facilities has in-
creased from 24 to 115 in Japan and from 0 to 6 in East Asia. Over the
1This is reflected by the share of expenditures on non-military logistics, which are
estimated to 11% of the GDP in the United States (Thomas and Griffin, 1996).
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recent period of 1991-1993, the increase in the number of plants located in
East Asia has boomed to 29.
Clearly, there is a need for a better understanding of the possible eco-
nomic consequences of the process of international fragmentation. Within
the neoclassical framework of trade theory, its impact on output, wages and
welfare has been studied by assuming that fragmentation amounts to some
form of technological progress. Not surprisingly, results are often ambigu-
ous because they depend on whether offshore outsourcing takes place in a
labor-intensive or in a capital-intensive sector (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001).
However, it has also been argued that international fragmentation shifts up
the production possibility frontier of the national economy, thus suggest-
ing that it is always welfare-enhancing (Arndt, 1997). When fragmentation
changes prices, Deardoff (2001) qualifies such a statement by showing that
the emergence of a supply chain can affect adversely one country by turning
its terms of trade against it. Furthermore, even when a country gains from
fragmentation, some factor owners in this country may lose.2
In this paper, we are interested in studying cross-border fragmentation
in a different setting, and so for at least two reasons. First, we believe
that imperfect competition suits better the behavior of firms engaged in
fragmenting their production than does perfect competition. Second, we
allow for labor dualism because the existence of both skilled and unskilled
labor is crucial for international fragmentation to arise. To achieve our goal,
we therefore use a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition à
la Dixit-Stiglitz that incorporates the following ingredients. Each firm has
two units, a headquarter and a single plant. Headquarters use skilled labor
whereas plants use headquarter services together with unskilled labor. Each
firm is free to decentralize its production overseas by choosing for its plant a
location far from its headquarter. Besides its greater realism, this modeling
strategy allows us to integrate various ideas within a common framework,
which can be solved analytically.
In the literature, the secular decline in transportation and trade costs
has been considered as a major element of the process of globalization. We
also want to stress the fact that the development of new information and
communication technologies is another major force that should be accounted
2Another strand of the literature related to the idea of fragmentation finds its origin
in the multinational enterprise. However, it does not address, at least directly, the issues
that motivate us (Dunning, 1981; Markusen, 1995; Caves, 1996).
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for in order to better understand the evolution of the geography of modern
economies. With this in mind, two types of spatial costs are taken into
account in our model, namely communication costs and trade costs. Low
trade costs allow firms producing overseas to sell their output on their home
market at a low price. Equally important, but perhaps less recognized, is
the fact that coordinating activities within the firm is more costly when
headquarter workers and plant workers are physically separated. However,
lower communication costs make such a coordination easier and, therefore,
facilitates the process of fragmentation.3 How does the spatial division of
labor change when communication and trade costs become lower, and what
are the corresponding implications for the various groups of workers, are
precisely the topics we want to study in this paper.
Management facilities are established in large urban agglomerations be-
cause many of the functions in which they are involved require personal
communications among skilled workers. These contacts facilitate the trans-
mission of information regarding the development of new products (Duranton
and Puga, 2001), while allowing workers of different firms to build the trust
required to write incomplete contracts (Leamer and Storper, 2001). Head-
quarters workers also benefit from the the availability of differentiated local
service suppliers and from the proximity of other headquarters and power
centers such as governments, trade associations and international agencies
(Davis and Henderson, 2003). Even though those various processes may be
described at the microeconomic level (Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Duranton and
Puga, 2004), for our purpose it is convenient to work with a reduced form
such as the one used by Henderson (1988), in which all microeconomic in-
teractions among headquarters’ workers are subsumed by means of a simple
Marshallian externality that says that the productive efficiency of headquar-
ters rises with the number of firms belonging to the same agglomeration.
For international fragmentation to arise, the intra-firm coordination costs
must be sufficiently low so that operating a plant in a distant place is not
too costly, whereas trade costs must decrease substantially to permit the
supply of large markets at low delivery costs from distant locations. In order
to make low-wage areas more accessible and attractive for the setting of
their production, firms therefore need the development of new information
3Mokyr (2002) argues convincingly that the existence of high coordination costs was
probably the main reason for bringing workers “under the same roof” in the eves of the
Industrial Revolution.
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and communication technologies as well as a substantial fall in trade costs.
Interestingly, this is precisely what we have witnessed during the last decades.
Previewing our main results, we study in section 3 how plants are distrib-
uted between the two regions when all headquarters are set up in one region.
As said above, globalization has two main facets in that it goes hand in hand
with lower trade barriers as expressed through decreasing tariffs and trans-
portation costs, on the one hand, and lower communication costs between
headquarters and plants generated by the development of the new informa-
tion and communication technologies, on the other. In section 4, we show
that all plants are located with their headquarters when communication costs
are sufficiently high. In this case, all firms are national and established in the
core region. Once communication costs steadily decrease, the industry moves
toward a configuration in which some firms are multinational whereas oth-
ers are national. Note that an equilibrium involving firms of different types
does not suggest itself because firms are a priori identical. It comes about as
the spatial division of labor changes with the level of communication costs.4
Eventually, when these costs have reached a sufficiently low level, the econ-
omy ends up with a deindustrialized core that retains only firms’ strategic
functions.
A fall in trade costs may lead to fairly contrasted patterns of production.
When communication costs are high, reducing trade costs leads to a growing
agglomeration of plants within the core, very much as in the core-periphery
model developed by Krugman (1991). However, the agglomeration process is
here gradual instead of exhibiting a bang-bang behavior. Things are totally
different when communication costs are low. For high trade costs, most
plants are still located within the core region. However, once trade costs
fall below some threshold, the re-location process unfolds over a small range
of trade cost values. This observation could explain why the process of
deindustrialization of some developed countries seems, first, to be slow and,
then, to proceed quickly, yielding a space-economy very different from the
initial one. Thus, our model seems to support a (partial) deindustrialization
of the core region, unless new activities are developed there.
Finally, our framework allows us to study the impact of the reduction
in intrafirm coordination costs on the welfare of workers. As more plants
4Such a mixed configuration of firms is reminiscent of what was observed in the 19th
centtury, when (centralized) factories and (decentralized) putting-out trades coexist over
a long time period, even in England (Mokyr, 2002).
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move into the periphery, the unskilled workers residing there are better off
whereas the unskilled living in the core are worse off, as expected. Totally
unexpected (at least to us) is the outcome that the skilled working in the
management facilities located within the core are also hurt by the fragmen-
tation of firms. Indeed, even though their nominal wage is unaffected, they
suffer from an increase in the local price index. Accordingly, both types of
workers living in the core are worse off when firms gradually relocate their
plants into the periphery. Although each firm gets fragmented in the pursuit
of its own interest, such a strategy might hurt them all, as if “going multi-
national” were to obey a prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, once it is recognized
that the market economy is imperfectly competitive, the process of fragmen-
tation can be harmful to both the skilled and unskilled workers living in
the core. By contrast, it would be beneficial to the workers located in the
periphery. As a result, fragmentation would contribute to narrowing the gap
between rich and poor countries. Hence, our paper suggests that one of the
main engines of globalization - fragmentation - might well have redistributive
consequences that vastly differ from those expected by the anti-globalization
demonstrators. It also runs against the popular idea that the internaliza-
tion of production would lie at the origin of the observed inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries.
These results may (partially) rest on some particularities of the Dixit-
Stiglitz model. However, it should be kept in mind that this model is the
workhorse of most recent theories of trade and growth. So our results can-
not be dismissed on that basis only. Although more work is called for, our
analysis could provide possible insights regarding, for example, the relative
stagnation of the today’s Japanese economy, which has been experiencing a
large re-location flow of its industrial plants toward China and other devel-
oping countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented
in section 2 whereas the equilibrium is characterized in section 3. In section
4, we study the impact of decreasing communication and trade costs on the
market outcome. The welfare impact of falling communication costs is dealt
with in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
The economic space is made of two regions, A and B. There are two pro-
duction factors, the high-skilled workers and the low-skilled workers whose
populations are given. The skilled workers are perfectly mobile between re-
gions whereas the unskilled are immobile. The economy has two sectors, the
modern sector (M) and the traditional sector (T). The M-sector produces a
continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product under increas-
ing returns. Each variety of the M-sector is produced by a single firm, using
both skilled and unskilled labor. Specifically, each firm has a headquarter,
which uses skilled workers to produce services that are firm-specific assets à
la Williamson, and operates a single plant, using headquarter services and
unskilled workers to produce its variety. The headquarter and production
facility of a firm need not be located together. When both are located in
the same region, the firm is national ; when they are not, the firm is multi-
national. Hence, the fragmentation of the firm is only vertical. The T-sector
produces a homogeneous good under constant returns, using unskilled labor
as the only input.
Preferences are identical across all workers and described by a Cobb-
Douglas utility:
U = QµΥ1−µ/µµ(1− µ)1−µ 0 < µ < 1 (1)
where Q stands for an index of the consumption of the modern sector va-
rieties, while Υ is the consumption of the output of the traditional sector.
Because the modern sector provides a continuum of differentiated varieties
of size m, the index Q is given by
Q =
∙Z m
0
q(i)ρdi
¸1/ρ
0 < ρ < 1 (2)
where q(i) represents the consumption of variety i ∈ [0,m]. In (2), the pa-
rameter ρ stands for the inverse of the intensity of love for variety over the
differentiated product. When ρ is close to 1, varieties are close to perfect sub-
stitutes; when ρ decreases, the desire to spread consumption over all varieties
increases. If we set
σ ≡ 1
1− ρ
then σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, which varies
between 1 and∞. Since there is a continuum of firms, each firm is negligible
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and the interactions between any two firms are zero, but aggregate market
conditions (e.g., the average price across firms) affects each firm.
If Y denotes the consumer income, pT the price of the traditional good,
and p(i) the price of variety i, then the demand functions are
Υ = (1− µ)Y/pT (3)
q(i) =
µY
p(i)
p(i)−(σ−1)
P−(σ−1)
= µY p(i)−σP σ−1 i ∈ [0,m] (4)
where P is the price index of the differentiated product given by
P ≡
∙Z m
0
p(i)−(σ−1)di
¸−1/(σ−1)
(5)
Introducing (3) and (4) into (1) yields the indirect utility function
v = Y P−µ(pT )−(1−µ) (6)
Technologies in each of the two sectors differ fromwhat is usually assumed
in economic geography models. The technology in the T-sector is such that
one unit of output requires ar ≥ 1 units of unskilled labor in region r = A,B.
Without loss of generality, we set aA = 1 and aB ≥ 1, thus allowing unskilled
workers in the traditional sector to be more productive in region A than
in region B. Let LA and LB be the number (mass) of unskilled workers in
region A and B, respectively. In order to retain the standard assumption of
symmetry between the two regions, we assume that the spatial distribution of
unskilled workers is such that both regions have the same amount of effective
units of unskilled labor, denoted L/2:
LA =
LB
aB
=
L
2
(7)
The output of the T-sector is costlessly traded between the two regions,
thus implying that its price is the same across regions. It is chosen as the
numéraire so that pT = 1. We further assume that the expenditure share
(1−µ) on the T-good is sufficiently large for the T-good to be always produced
in both regions.5 In this case, the equilibrium wages for the unskilled are such
that
wLA = 1 w
L
B = 1/aB ≤ 1 (8)
5A sufficient condition for this to hold is that µ < 1/(1 + ρ).
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In other words, our model allows us to cope with a given wage differential
across regions for the unskilled workers.6 Hence, there is a factor-price motive
that may explain vertical fragmentation. However, as will be seen below,
factor price differential is not the only reason for the multinationalization of
firms.
The technology of theM-sector is more involved. As said above, each firm
has a headquarter as well as a production plant, and both may be separated
in space. The setting of a headquarter (HQ) requires a fixed amount f of
skilled labor. Because each firm needs a headquarter and because skilled
workers are used only by headquarters, the total number (mass) of firms in
the economy is given by
m = S/f
where S is the total number of skilled workers.
When the HQ is located in region r and the plant in region s, producing
q(i) units of variety i requires l(i) units of unskilled labor:
l(i) = crsq(i)
where crs > 0 is the plant’s marginal labor requirement, whereas the fixed
cost associated with the operation of a plant is subsumed in the parameter f
defined above. The value of crs decreases with the effectiveness of the services
provided by the HQ to its plant, which depends itself on the following two
factors. First, the agglomeration of HQs within the same region generates
Marshallian externalities which make the HQ of firm i more effective in its
supply of services. This implies that crs decreases with the number mr ≥ 0
of HQs established in region r. Second, the distance between the HQ and its
plant affects negatively the effectiveness of the HQ-services. More precisely,
let c(m) be a decreasing function of m such that c(∞) > 0. Then, when both
the HQ and the plant are located in the same region (r = s) we have
crr = c(mr)
whereas, when they are located in different regions, we have
crs = c(mr)TC for r 6= s
6Note that (8) also implies that the evolution of relative wages between skilled and
unskilled workers is obtained by determining how the earnings of the skilled vary.
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where TC > 1 accounts for all the impediment to coordination within the
firm when the HQ and plant are physically separated. When the information
to transfer is not easily codified, we may expect TC to be large. The cost
TC also rises with the uncertainty associated with conducting business in a
distant location.
As a result, when the plant is located with its HQ in region r, the plant
production function is given by
l(i) = c(mr)q(i) r = s
By contrast, when the plant is set up in a different region, we have:
l(i) = c(mr)TCq(i) r 6= s
This specification has two important implications. First, when the plant is
separated from its HQ, it is less efficient and, thus, needs a larger amount
of local input. So we recognize that the physical separation of headquarters
and plants generates a cost for firms; however, we also recognize that the
corresponding cost TC may decrease with the development of new communi-
cation technologies. Second, as long as the level of HQ-services is the same,
unskilled workers are equally productive once they work in firms belonging
to the modern sector. This is because firms are able to organize their produc-
tion in the same way whatever the plant’s location.7 Furthermore, because
of the existence of a perfectly competitive traditional sector in each of the
two regions, the nominal wages of the unskilled (8) are unaffected by the
re-location of the industrial plants. As will be seen in section 5, this is not
true for their real wages.
As usual, the output of theM-sector is shipped at a positive cost according
to an iceberg technology à la Samuelson (1954): when one unit of any variety
of the differentiated product is moved from region r to region s 6= r, only
a fraction 1/TM arrives at destination with TM > 1. Within each region,
transportation is costless. Hence, if variety i is produced in region r and sold
at the mill (fob.) price pr(i), the price paid by a consumer located in region
s (6= r) is pr(i)TM .
7Note that the main conclusions drawn in section 4 hold true if the productivity of
the unskilled working for the modern sector is lower in region B than region A. This
can be achieved by multiplying TC by a positive constant accounting for the productivity
difference in the modern sector.
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Let wHr be the wage earned by skilled workers in region r. Then, using
(7) and (8) the total income of region r is such that
Yr = mrfw
H
r + L/2 r = A,B (9)
Using (4), the total demand for variety i produced in region r can be shown
to be given by the following expression:
qr(i) = µYrpr(i)
−σP σ−1r + µYs[pr(i)TM ]
−σP σ−1s TM (10)
where Pr (resp., Ps) stands for the price index of the differentiated good in
regions r (resp., s), which is defined later.
Because there is a continuum of firms, each one is negligible in the sense
that its action has no impact on the market. Hence, when choosing its prices,
a firm located in r accurately neglects the impact of its decision over the two
price indices Pr and Ps. In addition, because firms sell differentiated varieties,
each one has some monopoly power and faces the demand function (10). Let
Mrs (resp., mrs) be the set (resp., the number) of firms whose headquarters
are in region r and plants in region s, with r, s = A,B. The profit of firm
i ∈Mrr is as follows:
πrr(i) = pr(i)qr(i)− wHr f − wLr c(mr)qr(i)
so that the equilibrium mill price charged by firm i in region r:
p∗r(i) =
wLr c(mr)
ρ
i ∈Mrr (11)
Similarly, the profit of a firm i ∈Mrs with r 6= s is as follows:
πrs(i) = ps(i)qs(i)− wHr f − wLs c(mr)TCqs(i)
so that the equilibrium mill price charged by the plant located in region s is
p∗s(i) =
wLs c(mr)TC
ρ
i ∈Mrs and r 6= s (12)
Comparing (11) and (12) reveals that the equilibrium prices of the same va-
riety produced in either of the two regions differ not only because of the wage
differential for the unskilled, but also because of the higher communication
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costs (TC) of the HQ-services that a firm must incur when it decentralizes
its production.
Using (5), (7) and (8), we may determine the regional price index in
region r as follows:
Pr =
(
mrr
µ
wLr c(mr)
ρ
¶−(σ−1)
+msr
µ
wLr c(ms)TC
ρ
¶−(σ−1)
+T
−(σ−1)
M
"
mrs
µ
wLs c(mr)TC
ρ
¶−(σ−1)
+mss
µ
wLs c(ms)
ρ
¶−(σ−1)#)−1/(σ−1)
in which the first two terms account for the varieties produced in region r
and the last two for those produced in s. The real wage, or the indirect
utility (6), of the unskilled and of the skilled workers is respectively defined
by
ωLr = wLr /P µr r = A,B
ωHr = wHr /P µr r = A,B
Finally, for a given distribution of HQs and plants between the two re-
gions, the equilibrium profits may be obtained as follows:
π∗rr = k1[wLr c(mr)]−(σ−1)(YrP σ−1r + YsP σ−1s T
−(σ−1)
M )− wHr f
π∗rs = k1[wLs c(mr)TC ]−(σ−1)(YrP σ−1r T
−(σ−1)
M + YsP
σ−1
s )− wHr f r 6= s
where
k1 ≡
µ(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
is a positive constant. Hence, the free entry condition becomes
max {π∗AA,π∗AB,π∗BB,π∗BA} = 0
which implies that the wage paid to the skilled working in HQs comes from
the operating profits earned by plants. As mentioned in the introduction,
the fragmentation of the firm therefore gives rise to a interregional transfer
of profits from the plant to the HQ.
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3 Spatial equilibrium when the HQs are ag-
glomerated
For the reasons discussed in the introduction, we focus on the pattern in
which all HQs are located within the same region. Because the unskilled in
region A are more productive than those in region B, they are paid a higher
nominal wage. Therefore, since firms are driven by nominal wages, as trade
costs fall, it seems reasonable to expect the re-location of plants into region
B. This opens the door to the possible separation of HQs in region A, which
we call the core, and of plants in region B, called the periphery of the global
economy. In this section, we are interested in the way production facilities
are distributed between these two regions.
The assumption above regarding the location of HQs implies that mA =
m, mB = 0, mBA = mBB = 0, and mAA + mAB = m. In what follows,
we are interested in the way production facilities are distributed between
the two regions as well as in the impact of decreasing trade costs (TM) and
communication costs between HQs and plants (TC) under the presence of a
given wage differential (aB > 1). To this effect, it will appear convenient to
use the following notation:
θ ≡ mAA
m
φC ≡ (TC/aB)−(σ−1) φM ≡ T
−(σ−1)
M
Observe that φM varies between 0 (prohibitive trade costs) and 1 (zero trade
costs) and, therefore, measures the degree of integration between the two
regions. By contrast, φC varies from 0 (prohibitive communication costs) to
aσ−1B > 1 (zero communication costs) for a fixed value of aB > 1. Hence, φC
may be interpreted as an index of the degree of decentralization within each
firm, which accounts for both the communication costs and the unskilled wage
differential. In what follows, we will describe the equilibrium configurations
for all possible values of φC > 0 because the value of aσ−1B may be very large.
However, the reader should keep in mind the fact that, once φC has reached
its upper bound aσ−1B , the corresponding configuration will be the ultimate
one in the global economy. Stated differently, the entire process does not
unfold and stops as soon as φC = aσ−1B .
The HQs being located in region A, the price indices boil down to:
PA =
c(m)
ρ
m−1/(σ−1) [θ + (1− θ)φCφM ]−1/(σ−1) (13)
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PB =
c(m)
ρ
m−1/(σ−1) [θφM + (1− θ)φC ]−1/(σ−1) (14)
whereas regional incomes and profits become respectively
YA = Sw
H
A + L/2 YB = L/2
and
π∗AA =
µf
σS
∙
SwHA + L/2
θ + (1− θ)φCφM
+
L/2
θ + (1− θ)φCφ−1M
¸
− wHA f (15)
π∗AB =
µf
σS
∙
SwHA + L/2
θφ−1C φ
−1
M + (1− θ)
+
L/2
θφ−1C φM + (1− θ)
¸
− wHA f (16)
The equilibrium conditions for the HQs to be agglomerated in region A
and the plants to be dispersed between the two regions are obtained in three
steps. We first determine the conditions for plants to be located in both
regions (Step 1), whereas we deal with the two extreme cases in which all
plants are located in the core or in the periphery in Step 2. Finally, Step
3 identifies a sufficient condition for all the HQs to be agglomerated in the
core.
Step 1. We solve the equilibrium conditions when π∗AA = π∗AB = 0
and determine the corresponding (φC ,φM)-domain. The condition π∗AA = 0
yields:
wHA =
µL
σS
θ + (1− θ)φC(φM + φ−1M )/2
[θ + (1− θ)φCφM − µ/σ)][θ + (1− θ)φCφ−1M ]
(17)
Furthermore, the condition π∗AA = π∗AB leads to
φCφ−1M − 1
1− φCφM
· θ + (1− θ)φCφM
θ + (1− θ)φCφ−1M
= 1 +
2SwHA
L
(18)
Solving (17) and (18) for θ, we obtain
θ(φC ,φM) ≡
1+µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1−µ/σ
2
φM − φC
φ−1M + φM − (φ−1C + φC)
(19)
which is well defined provided that the denominator is nonzero, that is, φC 6=
φM and φCφM 6= 1. Assuming that these two conditions hold, differentiating
(19) with respect to φC yields
∂θ(φC ,φM)
∂φC
= − F (φC ,φM)
(φ−1M + φM − φ−1C − φC)2
(20)
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where
F (φC ,φM) ≡
µ
1− µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1 + µ/σ
2
φM
¶
+
µ
1 + µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1− µ/σ
2
φM
¶
φ−2C −2φ−1C
(21)
It is shown in the appendix that F (φC ,φM) is always positive so that (20) is
always negative for any fixed value of φM < 1 when the denominator of (19)
is nonzero.
We must now determine the conditions under which 0 ≤ θ(φC ,φM) ≤ 1.
For this purpose as well as for the rest of the analysis, it will appear to be
convenient to use the iso-share curves defined as follows:
θ(φC ,φM) = θ for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
Solving this equation for φC , it is readily verified that this solution, denoted
φC(φM ; θ), always exists and is unique:
φC(φM ; θ) =
g(φM ; θ) +
p
g2(φM ; θ) + 4θ(1− θ)
2(1− θ) for any θ ∈ [0, 1) (22)
where
g(φM ; θ) ≡
µ
1 + µ/σ
2
− θ
¶
φ−1M +
µ
1− µ/σ
2
− θ
¶
φM (23)
whereas, for θ = 1
φC(φM ; 1) =
µ
1− µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1 + µ/σ
2
φM
¶−1
(24)
Two specific iso-share curves turn out to be of special importance: the unit
iso-share curve given by (24) and the zero iso-share curve corresponding to
θ = 0, that is,
φC(φM ; 0) = g(φM ; 0) ≡
1 + µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1− µ/σ
2
φM (25)
These two curves are depicted in Figure 1 by the top and bottom bold lines.
Figure 1: Iso-share curves for plant distribution
It is easy to check that
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φC(1; θ) = 1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
∂φC(φM ; θ)
∂φM
¯¯¯¯
φM=1
= −µ/σ for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
These properties state that, for all admissible values of θ, all iso-share curves
go through 1 when φM = 1 and have the same negative slope.
We are now ready to solve our problem. Let
Φ ≡ {(φC ,φM);φC(φM ; 1) < φC < φC(φM ; 0), 0 < φM < 1}
be the (φC ,φM)-domain delineated by the top and bottom bold lines of Figure
1. It is readily verified that Φ is included in the set defined by the two
inequalities
φM < φC < φ−1M (26)
Hence, it must be that φC 6= φM and φCφM 6= 1 when (φC ,φM) ∈ Φ. This
implies that the denominator of (19) is always nonzero on Φ. As θ(φC ,φM) is
decreasing with respect to φC over Φ, it follows that θ(φC ,φM) ∈ (0, 1) if and
only if φC(φM ; 1) < φC < φC(φM ; 0). Finally, it can be shown that θ(φC ,φM)
is continuous over the closure of Φ. Hence, θ(φC ,φM) ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
φC(φM ; 1) ≤ φC ≤ φC(φM ; 0) because all the corresponding iso-share curves
are included in the closure of Φ.
It remains to determine the equilibrium wage. Substituting (19) in (17)
yields after several simplifications:
wHA =
L
S
µ/σ
1− µ/σ (27)
which is always positive. The fact that wHA is independent of φC (as well as of
φM) means that firms react to a decrease in communication costs by adjusting
noncooperatively the location of their plants in order to keep the level of their
nominal operating profits constant. Note, however, that wHA rises with the
share of the industrial sector (µ), the degree of product differentiation of
its output (1/σ) as well as with the ratio between the unskilled and skilled
workers (L/S).
Step 2. In the South-East area of Figure 1 below the bottom bold line,
it is readily verified that π∗AA = 0 > π∗AB, which means that all plants are
agglomerated in the core (θ∗ = 1). In this domain, setting θ∗ = 1 in (17)
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yields somewhat unexpectedly, the same expression as (27) for the nominal
wage of the skilled workers.
Likewise, in the North-East domain of Figure 1 above the top bold line,
we have π∗AB = 0 > π∗AA so that all plants are located in the periphery
(θ∗ = 0). Setting θ∗ = 0 in (16) and solving for wHA yields again (27) for
the nominal wage of the skilled workers. Thus, regardless of the equilibrium
pattern of plant distribution, the nominal wage of the skilled workers is given
by (27), which is itself independent of the values of trade and communication
costs.
This unexpected result may be explained as follows. First, because the
nominal wage of unskilled labor in efficiency units is normalized to one in
both regions, the nominal income of each region is given by (9) with mA =
m and mB = m, which does not depend on TM and TC. Second, when
communication costs decrease, (11) implies that a firm with a plant in region
B becomes more competitive. But, as the same holds for all multinational
firms, the reduction in communication costs also makes the firm in question
less competitive. In the present context, these two opposite effects just cancel
out, thus implying that the firm’s profits are unaffected. The same story
applies to a decrease in trade costs. Consequently, the level of equilibrium
profits made by a firm are unaffected by changes in trade and communication
costs. This in turn implies that the zero-profit equilibrium wage of the skilled
remains constant.
Step 3. It remains to determine when the equilibrium conditions π∗BB ≤
0 and π∗BA ≤ 0 are satisfied. Since all skilled workers are to be in region A,
it must be that ωHA ≥ ωHB . Without loss of generality, we may assume that
ωHA = ωHB , which amounts to
wHA =
P µB
PµA
wHB
Consider first the (φC ,φM)-domain for which π∗AA = π∗AB = 0. Using π∗AB =
0, it is then readily verified that π∗BB ≤ 0 holds if and only if
∙
c(0)
c(m)
¸σ−1
≥
∙
θ∗φM + (1− θ∗)φC
θ∗ + (1− θ∗)φCφM
¸µ/(σ−1)
T σ−1C (28)
Similarly, using π∗AA = 0, π∗BA ≤ 0 holds if and only if
∙
c(0)
c(m)
¸σ−1
≥
∙
θ∗φM + (1− θ∗)φC
θ∗ + (1− θ∗)φCφM
¸µ/(σ−1)
T
−(σ−1)
C
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which is always satisfied when (28) holds. Note that the right hand side of
(28) is strictly decreasing in θ∗ so that π∗BB ≤ 0 and π∗BA ≤ 0 hold as long as
(28) is satisfied for θ∗ = 1, that is,
c(0)
c(m)
≥ TC
T
µ/(σ−1)
M
(29)
In words, all firms choose to agglomerate their HQs in region A when the
Marshallian externalities are sufficiently strong with respect to the communi-
cation cost over the trade cost.8 This is likely to hold when communication
costs are not too high compared to trade costs.
Likewise, in the (φC ,φM)-domain for which either π∗AA = 0 > π∗AB or
π∗AB = 0 > π∗AA hold, it is easy to see that (29) always assures that π∗BB ≤ 0
and π∗BA ≤ 0.
To sum-up, we have shown the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that (29) holds. Then, the configuration in which
all HQs are agglomerated in region A, whereas mθ∗ plants are located in A
and m(1− θ∗) plants in B is a spatial equilibrium, where θ∗ is given by
θ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if φC ≤ φC(φM ; 1)
θ(φC ,φM) if φC(φM ; 1) < φC < φC(φM ; 0)
0 if φC(φM ; 0) ≤ φC
4 The impact of economic integration on the
distribution of plants
In this section, we explore the impact of decreasing trade costs of the differ-
entiated product (φM increases) as well as decreasing communication costs
between HQs and plants (φC increases), assuming that Marshallian external-
ities are strong enough for (29) to always hold.
To this end, we introduce the critical iso-share curve obtained when
θ(φC ,φM) = (1 + µ/σ)/2 ≡ θc, that is,
φC(φM ; θc) =
µ/σ
1− µ/σ
∙q
φ2M + (σ/µ)2 − 1− φM
¸
(30)
8In the right hand side of (29), TC represents the saving in communication costs when
the HQ of a firm moves from region A to B while keeping its plant in B, whereas the term
T
µ/(σ−1)
M reflects the increase in the price index of M -goods for the skilled workers who
move to B with their HQ.
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which is depicted in Figure 1 by the middle bold line. Furthermore, we also
have
lim
φM→0
θ(φC ,φM) =
1 + µ/σ
2
for any φC > 0
which implies that both the vertical axis and the critical iso-share curve yield
the same share (1 + µ/σ)/2. Finally, for any θ > (1 + µ/σ)/2, it is easy to
check that iso-share curves are single-peaked with a maximum reached at
φM(θ) =
s
(2θ − 1)− µ/σ
(2θ − 1) + µ/σ
which is obtained by equating to zero the first derivative of (22), which turns
out to be the solution of ∂g/∂φM = 0, where g is given by (23). Clearly, φM(θ)
increases from 0 at θ = (1 + µ/σ)/2 to [(1 − µ/σ)/(1 + µ/σ)]1/2, while the
corresponding value of φC [φM(θ); θ] decreases along the broken line of Figure
1 from [(1 +µ/σ)/(1−µ/σ)]1/2 to [(1− (µ/σ)2]−1/2. When θ < (1+µ/σ)/2,
each iso-share curve is monotonistically decreasing from infinity to 1.
4.1 Reducing communication costs
Assume that φC and φM are such that 0 < θ∗ < 1 and consider a decrease in
communication costs between firms’ HQ and plant, as measured by a rise of
φC. Taking the distribution of plants θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) as fixed, the rise in φC has a
simple direct effect: international firms now charge a lower price (12) because
their marginal cost is lower, whereas national firms stick to the same price
as before (11). Consequently, international firms increase their market share
in each region at the expense of national firms. Profits being zero before φC
rose, this implies that
π∗AA < 0 < π∗AB
In other words, firms whose plants are located in region A now make negative
profits whereas those whose plants are located in region B earn positive
profits. Accordingly, reducing communication costs give to some integrated
firms an incentive to become fragmented.
Moving some plants into region B restore the profits of the integrated
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firms and reduce those of the fragmented firms. Indeed, using (26), we get
∂π∗AA
∂θ
= −µf
σS
(SwHA + L/2)(1− φCφM)
[θ + (1− θ)φCφM ]2
(1− θ)(φ−1M − φM)
θφ−1C + (1− θ)φ−1M
< 0
∂π∗AB
∂θ
= − θ
1− θ
∂π∗AA
∂θ
> 0
Hence, national firms restore their profits when there are less of them. This is
because the price index in the core rises when φC increases (see (31) below),
thus allowing firms that remain national to have higher demands in the core,
hence higher profits. Similarly, international firms’ profits decrease when
more firms are fragmented because the price index in the periphery decreases
when φC increases, so that international firms have a lower demand in the
periphery, hence lower profits. As a result, for an given value φM < 1,
reducing intrafirm communication costs leads to a gradual increase in the
share of plants located in the periphery.
As shown by Figure 1, when communication costs are sufficiently high, all
plants are set up in the core region (θ∗ = 1). Once φC is sufficiently large for
the unit iso-share curve to be hit, further decreases in communication costs
trigger a re-location of plants into the periphery. Up to the critical iso-share
curve, however, more than half of the plants stick to the core region (θ∗ >
(1 + µ/σ)/2). When communication costs fall below that value, eventually
all plants end up being located in the periphery (θ∗ = 0).
It is worth stressing the fact that the re-location process is affected by the
value of the trade costs. When trade costs decrease from sufficiently large
values (that is, φM is small but increasing), Figure 1 reveals that all plants
remain in the core for a wider range of φC-values, whereas the domain over
which the transition occurs shrinks. When φM reaches the values
1− µ/σ
1 + µ/σ
the domain of φC-values for which plants are agglomerated in the core also
shrinks, thus implying that the re-location process starts earlier. The larger
the share of the modern sector, the larger the degree of product differentiation
across varieties, or both, the larger the domain over which all plants are
agglomerated in the core.
The discussion above may then be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 2 Assume any given positive value of the trade costs. When
communication costs are sufficiently high, all plants are located with their
headquarters. When these costs become sufficiently low, the share of plants
located in the core starts decreasing. If communication costs keep decreasing,
the re-location process goes on monotonically until all firms are multinational.
4.2 Reducing trade costs
The impact of a decrease in trade costs (which is measured by a rise of φM)
is more involved because it depends on the value of intrafirm communication
costs in a nonlinear way. When φC ≤ 1 (or TC/aB ≥ 1), it is readily verified
that reducing trade costs leads to a growing agglomeration of plants together
with their HQs. This result is reminiscent of what is obtained in the standard
core-periphery model, but the agglomeration process is here gradual instead
of being discontinuous. In other words, in the absence of a wage differential,
economic integration fosters the agglomeration of plants within the core.
Things become more complicated when φC > 1 (or TC/aB < 1), a situa-
tion that happens provided that the productivity of unskilled workers in the
periphery is lower than in the core (aB > 1). Three cases may then arise. In
the first one, we have
1 < φC <
1p
1− (µ/σ)2
As Figure 1 shows, when trade costs decrease, θ∗ keeps rising from (1+µ/σ)/2
to 1. In other words, we observe a process of gradual agglomeration of
plants into the core because the forces at work in the standard core-periphery
model are dominant. However, when φM is very large, there is an “almost”
catastrophic re-location of plants into the periphery (the φC-domain over
which transition occurs is very small). This is because trade costs become
so low that it is optimal for the firms to take advantage of the lower wage
prevailing in region B by locating there.
In the second case, we have
1p
1− (µ/σ)2
< φC <
s
1 + µ/σ
1− µ/σ
Again, as trade costs decrease, plants progressively agglomerate in region A
until θ reaches the value for which φC [φM(θ); θ] = φC holds (i.e., φM hits
the broken line in Figure 1). However, further decreases in trade costs now
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lead to a gradual fall in the plant share of the core region until all plants are
established in region B.
In the third case, we have
[(1 + µ/σ)/(1− µ/σ)]1/2 < φC
Then, when trade costs are prohibitive, the mass of plants concentrated in
A is just equal to (1 + µ/σ)/2. As trade costs start falling, more and more
plants set up in the periphery until they are all clustered there (i.e. φM hits
the top bold line in Figure 1).
The results of this section may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 When TC/aB ≥ 1, a steadily decrease in trade costs leads to
a gradual agglomeration of plants in the core region. When TC/aB < 1, two
subcases may arise. If TC/aB is not too small, a steadily decrease in trade
costs leads, first, to a gradual agglomeration of plants in the core and, then,
to a re-location of plants into the periphery. If TC/aB is sufficiently small,
reducing trade costs triggers immediately the re-location process of plants into
the periphery.
5 The welfare analysis of globalization
It should be clear from the foregoing that the process of globalization may
have very contrasted implications for the various groups of workers involved.
In the sequel, we distinguish between the unskilled working in the core, the
unskilled residing in the periphery, and the skilled who live in the core because
all headquarters are agglomerated there. Although reducing communication
and trade costs may not have the same impact on the well-being of workers,
we restrict ourselves to a fall in communication costs caused by the develop-
ment of the new information and communication technologies, because the
way firms organize themselves is likely to be significantly affected by the level
of communication costs.9 As all nominal wages are constant, the welfare im-
pact of falling communication costs is driven by the changes in regional price
indices, which we now study.
9It is worth stressing that a decrease in trade costs leading to the re-location of pro-
duction facilities has similar welfare implications. Hence, to keep the analysis short, we
omit this case.
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For the price index of region A, using (13) we obtain
∂PA
∂φC
= − PA
σ − 1
(1− θ∗)φM + (1− φCφM)∂θ∗/∂φC
θ∗ + (1− θ∗)φCφM
When there is no overseas plant (θ∗ = 1), reducing communication costs has
no impact on the price index in region A. When φC rises sufficiently for θ∗
to belong to (0, 1), the analysis is less straightforward because two opposite
effects are at work. The direct effect is that varieties made in the periphery
are produced at a lower unit cost because of the decreasing communication
costs. The indirect effect is that more varieties are produced in the periphery,
thus making them more expensive for the workers in region A. Thus, the
net effect is a priori unclear. However, it turns out to be possible to show
that the latter effect dominates the former. The argument goes as follows.
Clearly,
∂PA
∂φC
≶ 0 if and only if − ∂θ(φC ,φM)
∂φC
≶ (1− θ)φM
1− φCφM
When φC(φM ; 1) < φC < φC(φM ; 0), some tedious calculations that make
use of the identity
φ−1M + φM − φ−1C − φC ≡ (φCφ−1M − 1)(1− φCφM)φ−1C
show that
−∂θ(φC ,φM)
∂φC
>
(1− θ)φM
1− φCφM
Therefore, we have
∂PA/∂φC > 0 when 0 < θ∗ < 1 (31)
Finally, when φC(φM ; 0) ≤ φC, θ∗ = 0 and we have
∂PA
∂φC
= − PA
(σ − 1)φC
< 0 when θ∗ = 0
For the price index of region B, using (14), it is readily verified that
∂PB
∂φC
= − PB
σ − 1
(1− θ∗)− (φC − φM)∂θ∗/∂φC
θ∗φM + (1− θ∗)φC
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When φC ≤ φC(φM ; 1), we have θ∗ = 1. Observing that ∂θ∗/∂φC = 0 at
θ∗ = 1 and setting θ∗ = 1 in the above expression, we see immediately that
∂PB/∂φC = 0 as long as θ∗ = 1. When φC(φM ; 1) < φC < φC(φM ; 0), we
have
∂θ∗
∂φC
=
∂θ(φC ,φM)
∂φC
which has been shown to be negative. Hence, we get
∂PB/∂φC < 0 when 0 < θ∗ < 1
Finally, when φC(φM ; 0) ≤ φC, we have θ∗ = 0. In this case
∂PB
∂φC
= − PB
(σ − 1)φC
< 0 when θ∗ = 0
As said above, because nominal wages are independent of φC, real wages
are determined by the evolution of the price index of the M-good. Consider,
first, the unskilled in the periphery. As long as θ∗ = 1, their real wage is
unaffected by a decrease in communication costs. When θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), we know
that ∂PB/∂φC < 0 so that the unskilled living in the periphery are getting
better off. Finally, when θ∗ = 1, ∂PB/∂φC < 0 still holds, thus implying that
the real wage of the unskilled living in B keeps rising. Thus, we may con-
clude that a fall in communication costs leave the unskilled in the periphery
unaffected as long as all plants remain in the core. By contrast, when the
re-location process has started, any further decrease in the communication
costs always make the unskilled in the periphery better off. This should not
come as a surprise. Indeed, when the communication costs fall, more and
more varieties are produced in the periphery where the unit production cost
of the corresponding plants decreases. Hence, the local price index must
decrease.
Regarding now the unskilled in the core, when there is no overseas plant
(θ∗ = 1), reducing communication costs has no impact on the price index
in region A and, therefore, on the well-being of the unskilled residing there.
When θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), we have seen that ∂PA/∂φC > 0 so that the unskilled
living in the core are getting worse off. Finally, when all plants are located
overseas, the unskilled living in the core benefit from further decreases in
communication costs because plants operate at lower cost. As a result, the
unskilled in A are now better off.
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It remains to investigate the impact of falling communication costs on the
welfare of the skilled. In fact, as their wage has been shown to be independent
of φC, what we have just seen about the unskilled in the core also applies to
the skilled. Because the unskilled residing in the core are also worse off, we
may conclude that welfare in the core region goes down as plants move into
the periphery. Accordingly, workers living in the periphery always gain from
technological innovations leading to sufficiently low transfer costs whereas
skilled and unskilled workers in the core always lose from the development of
such innovations. This runs against the “conventional wisdom” that claims
that only the unskilled living in the core are negatively affected by the process
of globalization. In addition, when the re-location process is completed,
further decreases in transfer costs make everybody in the economy better off
because the price index goes down in each region.
The results above are now summarized as follows.
Proposition 4 Assume that communication costs fall. First, all workers are
unaffected when all firms remain integrated. Once some firms start re-locating
their production facilities into the periphery, the skilled and unskilled in the
core are worse off, whereas the unskilled living in the periphery are better off.
Last, when all plants are located overseas, all workers benefit from further
lowering communication costs.
The result about the welfare of the skilled is surprising and deserves some
discussion. We view the reason for it in the fact that each firm accurately
neglects all general equilibrium effects because it is negligible. As each firm
does the same, all firms end up, after the decrease in communication costs,
in a situation in which they make real operating profits that are lower than
those made before the communication costs’ decrease.
Even though it would be an artefact of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, this re-
sult suffices to say that the skilled might also lose from going international,
whereas it is often argued in the general press that international fragmenta-
tion is one of the main reasons for the growing inequality among workers (or
between workers and capital owners) in developed countries. Our analysis
suggest that other reasons are to be sought to explain this growing inequal-
ity. However, our analysis shows that globalization is likely to have strong
redistributional impacts, some of which are not necessarily as such expected
a priori.
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6 Concluding remarks
Globalization has at least two facets in that it goes hand in hand with lower
trade costs between countries as well as with lower communication costs be-
tween HQs and plants (the economy moves in the North-East direction in
Figure 1). Even though the HQs remain within the same region because of
the many factors that keep them together, two very contrasted patterns must
be distinguished regarding the location of plants. In the first scenario, the
unskilled have about the same productivity in either region. Very much as
in economic geography, market integration then fosters the gradual agglom-
eration of plants in the region with the initial advantage, which is here the
region accommodating the HQs. In the second scenario, the productivity of
the unskilled in the periphery is (significantly) lower than the productivity
of the unskilled in the core. Although the process of integration might first
lead to the agglomeration of more plants in the core, eventually it triggers
the re-location of plants into the periphery because, once trade and commu-
nication costs have decreased sufficiently, the wage differential effect becomes
predominant. These two scenarios point to the importance of having suffi-
ciently large wage gaps for a vast multinationalization of activities to emerge
as a possible outcome of globalization.
To be sure, those conclusions have been derived under very simplifying
assumptions regarding the working of the labor market. First, one normally
expects the labor markets for the unskilled to react when the flow of re-
locations becomes significant. In this case, the process should slow down as
the nominal wage of the unskilled in the periphery rises whereas the nominal
wage of the unskilled in the core decreases (Krugman and Venables, 1995).
However, another possible response by firms to the rise of the nominal wage
in the periphery is to move their plants into a third region, namely the “pe-
riphery of the periphery”. This possibility should not be ignored, as shown
by the many on-going re-locations from Mexico to China. Second, at first
sight the move of non-skill-intensive activities offshore seems to favor the
skilled in the core region. However, we have seen that such a move does not
necessarily make these workers better off. Of course, there is nothing in our
framework that allows for innovation (the number of firms and varieties are
constant, whereas the new information and communication technologies gen-
erate no productivity gains in the HQs). Doing so meaningfully requires the
introduction of a R&D sector in the context of an endogenous growth model,
such as Fujita and Thisse (2003) in which firms are assumed to be integrated.
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Extending this setting to the case of multi-unit firms is a challenging topic
for future research.
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Appendix
Differentiating (21) with respect to φC yields
∂F
∂φC
= −2φ−3C
∙
1 + µ/σ
2
φ−1M +
1− µ/σ
2
φM − φC
¸
which implies that, for any fixed value of φM < 1, F (φC ,φM) achieves its
minimum at bφH = 1 + µ/σ2 φ−1M + 1− µ/σ2 φM
The minimum value of F is then as follows:
F (bφH ,φM) = 1 + (µ/σ)2 + [1− (µ/σ)2](φ−2M + φ2M)/2− 2
(1 + µ/σ)φ−1M + (1− µ/σ)φM
which is always positive because φ−2M + φ
2
M > 2 when φM < 1.
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Figure 1. Iso-share curves for plant distribution
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